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THE CHALLENGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Ladies and GBntlemen, 
1. I am deeply honoured to have been invited to address 
this distinguished gathering in Bonn, the capital of a powerful 
and friendly country which, no l e ss than mine, is preoccupied 
with the supreme and urgent tasks of strBngthening cooperation 
and reducing tensions b e twe e n n Btions. 
2. I am happy to be with y o u, a n elite group concerned with 
the study and analysis of foreign policies and international 
issues. 
3. I am conscious that I stand here at a moment of 
profound and historic change in Europe where the forc e s of 
peaceful regional cooperation a ue irresistibly at work. Soon 
this great European Economic Co mmunity of Six nations is likely 
to be increased to Ten, a further dramatic consolidation of 
Western Europe's economic and political power which can only 
strengthen the prospe cts for world peace and stability. 
4. But you in Western Europe are not content with building 
up this vast edifice of economic and political power in isolation. 
You are resolved, as your Government's Ostpolitik clearly 
manifests, to improve y our relati ons with your Eastern neighbours, 
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recognizing no doubt that the chances of success very much 
depend on the Federal Republic's important place in an 
increasingly united and self-reliant Community. 
5. The impending enlargement of the European Economic 
Community is likely to result in a change in the pattern of 
relationship in international affairs. On the other side 
of the globe, lies the People's Republic of China inhabited 
by a quarter of the human race. China's recent admission to 
the United Nations has also triggered off reappraisals within 
the chancelleries of the world. How will China behave in the 
United Nations? What impact will this have on the balance 
of power in Asia and elsewhere? What contribution would she 
make towards lasting peace now that she has been accepted 
into the international cJm~unity of nations. Perhaps the 
answers to these questions wJuld und0ubtedly have a profound 
influence nJt Jnly :)n the future Jf tl;·~-· Southeast Asi8.n 
region but als) the rest of the world. 
6. The role China will play in the future therefore 
looms large in the f~reign policy planning of Malaysia and 
presumably of uther SJutheast Asian countries. China's 
endorsement of the concept of neutralisation Jf Southeast 
Asian region Jr even an indication tu agree in principle to 
guarantee that Southeast Asia should be a regiJn of peace 
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and neutrality would in itself be a prelude to the ope-ning 
of a new era in Southeast Asia if n o t the world. 
7. Japan is an ~ ther major factor since, amJng other 
things, that formidable nation is expected to outstrip the 
Soviet Union in industrial producti on by the end o f this 
decade. Japan's policies towards Southeast Asia have yet 
to crystallize and, tJ the extent that they remain unclear, 
Southeast Asia's relati ons with her will c ontinue t~ cJntain 
an element of d o ubt and hesitancy. Yet, the logic of Japan's 
needs as a giant and expanding ec ~n omy and the relative 
prJximity 0f Southeast Asia with its vast ec on0mic ~nd human 
resources would appear to demand urgent agreement on mutually 
beneficial economic and political relations. 
8. My theme tonight is The Challenge in Southeast Asia. 
I should like first of all to comment on certain misconceptions 
about this region t J which Malaysia belongs. It is tJo often, 
regarded as a tottering, chrpnically unstable, divided region 
without reasonable prospe cts f or survival in the future. 
Perhaps the mass media's over-c0ncentrati)n un the more 
sensational aspects 0f events of So utheast Asia is responsible 
for this. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
9. Southeast Asia has gon e through a slow process of 
economic and political evolution. 
4. 
10. We in Malaysia have f ound this process n o t only slow 
but also painful. I can say witho ut exagerration that Malaysia 
has been through a baptism of fire in this proce s s fr om the early 
d ays o f c o l onialism to the era of inde p e ndence. 
11. First in the 40s there was the Japanese occupation 
which badly da maged our ec on omy. Then follow£ng the liberati on 
-J f the c J untry by .,) Ur p eople, we had a twe lve y ear Emergency when 
the Communi s t s tri e d to d e stroy our d e mocra tic way o f life . 
And mJ r e recently we had the Ma y 13 Tragedy wh e n o ur tw J main 
racial gr J ups - the Mal ays and the Chinese tried t o settl e their 
differenc e s by vio l e nc e . 
12. Indeed we have suff e red in the proc e ss - just as the 
Ge rma n pe~ple have suffe red fr 1m the expe ri e nc e s o f the Sec ond 
13. Bu t just as the Ge r man pe o pl e h a v e don e - we have e merged 
once again- s tr ~ nge r, m1 re se lf-re liant, mo re t o l e r ant and 
mo r e d e t e rmine d that e v e r n ~ t t J s uff e r a similar experi e nce 
a gain. 
~hat i s why we hav e t o ame nd o ur Con s tituti on. 
That is why we e x pend much n ee d e d r ev e nue to c ontain 
the r eon a nts o f the Communist t e rrorists in the Mal aysia/ 
Thai BcJ rd er. 
That is why we s eek the neutr~lisati 0 n of So utheast 
Asia. 
5. 
That is whf all oAr efforts are concentrated on 
devel oping our economy. 
14. We have arrived a~ stage now where in the process 
o f adjusting to a new situation and searching for an identity; 
we are g e tting more involved collectively with the futur e 
development cf the area as a whole. Our struggle against 
colonia lism has n ow give n ris e t o ano ther typ e ~ f struggl e 
the saf e guarding o f o ur right to live in p e ace and s e curity 
without extern~l interference. .The realisation h·as dawned 
on us that an unc oordinated S ) utheast Asia has l e ft us weak 
and perp e tually divide d. 
15. Our weakness a nd shc rtc Jmings in the past have made 
us easy prey t o exploitati on by for e ign p owers and their 
rivalri e s in th e regi on. We re a lize t oo that the s e c onflicts 
a nd riva lriGs a r e the Hour6e t o£ tension ~nd _ ins~cMrity in 
the regi ~ n. On this c o unt So utheast Asian C) untri e s hav e 
manife s t e d thair desire t o w Jrk thr,) ugh c onc e rted e fforts 
f or the exit o f thes e big powe r riva lries from the region 
in orde r t o bring ab1 ut pe ac e a nd s ec urity. 
16. The cri tic s l situa tion which h a s d evel ,;p e d between 
India and Pakistan to-da y c a n a lso b e r e l a t e d to the same 
pa tt e rn o f unc e rt a inty a nd t ensi .)n c n us e d by big po we r 
riva lry in S ;utheast A si ~ . 
17. The Suvi e t Uni un, China and the Unit e d St a tes 
all have a p ositive r .)l e t .1 p l s ~n r e s o lving the o utc vme 
6. 
of this situation and it is t o be hope d that they would 
consider their actions in the cont ext of the interests c f 
India and Pakistan. 
18. India's recogni ti _; n of :Bangla Desh adds a new 
el ement t o this ccnflict. This of course will complicate 
the issue furth er. 
19. Alth0ugh Malaysi a can only contribute in urging a 
peaceful s olution t o thi s conflict, my G)vernment f ervently 
hopes that a s oluti Jn can be f o und t o t h i s tragic conflict 
which will be satisfactory t o the parti e s concerned. 
20. This conflict provi de s a chall enge f or a ll pe ac e 
l oving nations t o strive t o b~ing ab o ut an amicabl e settlement 
t o the pr ~bl em . Southeast Asia pr 1vide s a simil ar challenge. 
21. It is true , of co urse, that S Jutheast Asia is n J 
different fr om any o ther r egi on in the world in the sens e 
that there is no abs Jlut e guar ~ nt ee of peace and stabl e · 
progres s pa rticul arly if e conomic dev e l opme nt doe s ne t k e e p 
pac e with ~opulati an gr owth and if l o c ~l insurgencies are na t 
contnin ed. H >wever, it i s my earn est c onvicti Jn tha t Southeast 
Asi a has prov ed its resili enc e during the past 25 y ears. 
Despit e the debilitating eff ects of col onial domin a ti ~n, of 
,)ften inefficient leadership, 1>f end emic insurgencies, of 
rapid populqtion gr0wth, o f Great Powe r rivalry- d espite 
all this, the new nati on-st a tes con tinue t~ succ ee d in their 
struggle f or survival. 
7 . 
22. Tuday, the drive t~wards ever-increasing cooperation 
in all fields, and especially in the economic sector is 
strcnger that ever before. Revvlutiunary nationalist leaders 
who preferred external adventures to d~mestic development 
have been replaced by pragmatists who rely on technocrats 
to implement their develJp~ent plans. 
23. The new breed of Southeast Asian leaders realize 
much more alearly th~n their predecessors that the ultimate 
test of n~tional independence is a h~gh degree of self-reliance 
within a framework of effective regi)nal cooperation. 
24. The changing pattern uf Southeast Asia with the 
reshaping of the p~wer balance in the region caused by the 
emergence of China as ~ major power necessitates urgent 
rethinking and raappraisal of sur policies with the view 
to establishing future relations with China and other major 
powers cJnsistent with our regional interest. 
25. It is with the realization of the above Jattern 
that we look ahead with determination and strength to meet 
the challenges ;f future on the following basis 
Firstly, to ensure the success of our internal 
ocon0mic development programme to combat poverty and correct 
the inbal~nce between the haves and the have nots, ~have 
to satisfy demands by building a viable and strong economy 
th2t WJuld be the pill~r of ·~ur intern~l strength and stability. 
8. 
Secondly, our eff , rts and aspirations f J r regi Jnal 
cooperation, which is gaining currently will be greatly 
sr-.~anned if we succeed in meeting the first chall enge . 
The measure of our success in regi onal c l oper~ti o n will 
dep end on the coo rdinati Jn of thes e e ff Jrts by str Jng and 
e c onomically st:J.bl e individual c Juntri e s in the r egion t 0 
work t ow~ rds a ha rmoniza ti on of int er e sts f or the pe ace 9 
s e curity and ec on.Jmic pr usperi ty ·_; f Southeast Asia as a Whvl e . 
Thirdly, Suutheast Asia s h Juld be abl e t 1 exist on 
', 
its uwn a s a regi )n which can st and t o its :wn sacurity and 
futur e dev e lopment with Jut outside int erf er enc e . The t e st 
will be in .Jur ability t -> w ·rk t _.ga ther and t ._, l c) _j k a ft e r 
our ,J wn future. 
26. Thus we have witness e d increasingly during the past 
f ew y ears a r egi c:, na l m veme n t t -~ wards who. t is kn ; w as n ,~' n-
alignment. N:.: n-alignment in s ~) utheast Asia co.nnu tes neithe r 
a r e l ap s e into iso l:::tti on n .. r an abdication uf r e sp ~J nsibili ty 
for the f a t e of individua l Sta t e s qnd o f the regi on as a whol e . 
Rather, it signifi e s a new m~o d, a new determina ti Jn t o secure 
f ' r the peopl e s thr ~ ugh o ut the r egi ~ n a st abl e basis of 
nati ona l s e lf-relianc e , e c ,nomic d ev e l o p~ent a nd social 
stability. 
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27. As the Bangkok Declarati )n which established the 
As s ociqti j n Jf S Jutheast Asian Nati ~ ns in 1967 prGclaimed:-
nrrhe c )Untries of Suutheast .Asia share a _pri mo.ry 
r es ponsibility f or strengthening the e conomic and s 0cial 
stability o f the regi on and ensuring their peaceful and 
progressive nati onal devel J pment, and that they are determined 
t o ens ure their s t a~ili ty a nd s ecurity fr om ext e rna l int e rference 
~ a~y f ~rm of o anifes t a ti on in J rder t ~ pr e se~ve the ir nati Jna l 
identiti e s in a cr crdanc e with the id eals and aspirati Jns 0f 
23 . :ha t was only f our y ears ag0 . Since t hen, AS EAN 
..:l:l':; moved s tadily f ;rw '""l rd. Incresaing ec .:· n ~·.m ic c Joperati on 
ho.::~ p8 ~r ed the way f ·r c ~OlJs rati .n in o ther fi e lds. ·The s e 
:~:~7''.nces a :::::' e r e l ::1 tively 111ode st, e s pec i fl; lly when coopa r ed t o 
-c :1G sc a l e of ec onomic a nd p .1 li tica l c :...;operati cn in Weste rn 
Eur~pe . But wh ~t is i mpJrt ant i s th~ t a firm basis f or r egi on al 
c~J~erati n ha s a lready bee n es t ~bli s he d in S0utheast Asia . 
2 ~ . On the 27th f l a st month, the For e i gn Ministers 
of Ind~ n es i a , Mal aysia, The Philippine s, Singap ~ r e , 2nd the 
Spec i ~ l Envoy o f the Na ti ona l Executive Council of Thail a nd 
·12 t in Kual a Luopur. The re~re s entatiTes j f the Five ASEAN 
; ·~ntri e~ oade a j ~ int De cl a r a tion which st 2t ed, amung 
, the r th i ngs ~ 
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" (1) Tnat Ind)nesia, Malqysia, The Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand are determined t ~ exert initially 
necessary efforts to secure the rec :1 gniti ~n of, and respect 
for, Southeast Asia as a Z8ne of peace, freedom and neutrality, 
free fr om any form or s ann ar o f int erference by outside p0wers; 
(2) That Southeast Asian c Juntri e s shJ uld m3ke c oncerted 
effc rts tJ broaden the a reas of c0o parati on which would c -J ntribute 
t ;~· their strength, s _; lidari ty and cl ser r c; lati .::> nship." 
30. In their J ~ int C~mmunique which the representatives f the 
Five ASEAN c ·untries issued t ogether with the Kuala Lumpur Decla-
rati..:·n, they stat ed th:::_t the five countries "w JUld c ontinue t J 
c _;nsul t each . .J ther with a view t 0 f staring an int egr2ted aJ)pr =ach 
on all matters and devel o ~ments which affect the S o~theast Asi~n 
regi on''. It was als 2 agre ed that a summit mee ting uf the Heads 
o f State ;r Govsrnment --:· f the AS:SAN c ~· untries wo uld be he ld in 
Manila ~n a date t o be ann c unc ed later. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration 
will be br ; ught t) th e att enti ·;n J f the o ther countri e s o f Suutheast 
Asia 9 namely, Burma , the Khme r Re~ ublic, the Kingdom 0f Laos, the 
Republic of Vietnam and the Dem0cra tic Re public of Vietnam, with 
the view t ) enc t uraging these c 1untri e s to a s s ociate thenselves 
with the aspirati ~ ns and obj ectives expre sse d in the Declarati~n. 
31. The Five ASE AN c 1untri e s h ;v e als 0 agreed t o est?blish 
a c :)mmi ttee 0f s eni )r •) ffici::tls drawn frc L'l the five c ,) untries t o 
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study and consider what further necess~ry steps should be taken 
tJ bring abJut the renlizati ~ n uf their objectives. This c )mmittee 
will be c Jnvened in Malaysia. 
32. Analysing the results uf the c ,Jnference, fr _; ill our 
stand-pcint, it is f )r the first time, th~t the five ASEAN c Juntries 
have jointly and categ~rically stated al~ud their determinati un 
tv secure the recogniti Jn of, and respect fJr, S0utheast Asia as 
a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. The Declqration, tJ this 
effect, is significant as it spells JUt the five c~untries' 
acceptance th~t the neutralis~ti on Jf Suutheast Asia is a 
desirable ._~ bjective. 1\J this end als u it neans a frase wc~rk 
is est2blished within which the re will be a greater cJncerted 
eff~rts by the Five t . WJrk t ogether t~ f ·ster an integrated 
appr J ach t, all mqtters th2t c 1ncern the future o f the region. 
33. In an ~ ther imp Jrtant c 'nt ext, the document sh:uld be 
c !nsidered in relati ~; n t :-.., the c ._;ming Nixc: n/Cho u En Lai meeting 
in Peking. This wJuld certainly have effect 0f drawing attentiun 
8f the two leaders t ~ the objectives uf the five C )Untries t o 
make S . utheqst Asi~ a zone of ~eace, freed um and neutrality 
free fr ~ m any fJrm ' r manner ,f interference by the cutside 
34.' Peking and Washington would alsu have t 0 t:::_ke c Jgnizance 
uf fact that in J ur calcula tiun the Declarc-.ti ) n envisages the 
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inclusion of the ..!Ylrticipati.)n Jf ther S )Utheast ...f' .. sian c:)untries 
wh o c0uld subscribe t0 the Declaration. 
35. 'Nhen l\1alaysia first annJunced her _i)T :) rKsal f 1r a 
neutrql Southeast Asia, it was received with scepticism by s0me 
c JUntries. Such scepticism was understandable - if I may say 
S J withJut being ~atr ~nising- since s~me regarded the pr)~Jsal 
as either too revolutionary or s 1mewhat unrealistic. T0J 
r2voluti2nary becaus e 0f the pessimistic assessment of regional 
realities. Huw c ·.Juld c ~_:untries, f )r example th )se c ;;nsti tuting 
Indochina, plagued and bedevilled by externql interventicn and 
grave internal pr _,blems, be expected realistically t __ accept 
neutralizati .n? After all, had no t the Geneva agreement of 
1954 and 1962 visualized neutralization and )roved tu be singularly 
unsuccessful? Others having treaty CJQmitments with the outside 
y wers felt, not unreasonably, that while the neutralization 
cJnceyt was laudable it had little practical v~lue in the sh~rt 
term alth0ugh it c ;uld bec 0me a de sirable long-tero g~ al. But 
the recent F·ive-Nati ,' n o eeting in Kual!:l Lum_tJur unequi7o ~r~~ly 
end~rsed the Jrinciple that Southeast Asia should and would 
bec.:Jme - c:nd I quote -· ~J. z ,:/ne .~f peace 9 freed .~Jm and neutrality, 
free from any f GITI 1r oanner of interference by ,J utside p Jwers. 
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This maj~r policy prcn ~ uncement by G)vernments representing 
ap~r Jxim~tely 200 milli Jn SJ utheast Asians, am ~ng o ther things, 
reflects the widespread rec ·~ gnition ~ f the need t o ke ep pace with 
rapid chnnging developments affecting the regi un. 
36. Nvn-alignment, as I have suggested earlier, is fast 
bec ~ming the v ehicle 0f increasing nati onal self-reliance and 
self-c onfidence c Jupled with a gr0wing awaren e ss c f the vit a l 
imp rtance c f regi ~ n a l strength and s~lidnrity. Neutralizati Jn, 
in this C)ntext, can be r egarded as the extensi Jn 0r CJ DC umitant 
of the determinati )n by the pe ?les '.Jf the regi :J n t(__, shape uur 
~ wn destiny by ~ urs e lve s. This sure ly is the crucial difference 
b e twe 8n J Ur neutralization po licy which is ba s ed on self-reliance, 
a nd the neutraliza ti on 2:...'1: .. ~..:.1~:-3 ''":: the past, which h ,J wever 
we ll-int enti ,~~ n c: d, wer e the fruit of the dipl umr1 tic ingenuity J f 
_, utsicl ers. Such schewe s were d _ .. Jmecl t _; c .J lla) s e since they were 
na t r o ' ted in na ti unal sentimGnts and aspiratiJns ,f the ve0ple 
rn ~. .. st directly c .. ncerned. In v ery simple words, ASEAN' s call f ur 
a n e utr Rl s ·, uthe ast Asi o i s genuin e be cquse it is native-based. 
It is the pr )duct Jf inde pen de nt S Jutheast Asian initiative and 
judgement. 
37. I am, ther e f lr e fully c 0nfiden t th1t ne utralizati >n 
as we perceive it is n Jt only a d e sir~bl e r egi un2l objective but 
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the hJpe uf the future. It is born not out ~ f fear - alth ugh the 
region will cJntinue to be beset by disruptive challenges - but 
uut cf a deep and growing confidence and faith in urselves . 
38 . And what, YJU may ask, are the specifics uf the n~utra-
lization concept? They may take variJus f Jrms depending on the 
detailed discussions th3t are about to commence. But Malaysia 
feels that a starting-jJ.,int shuuld br; r e cognition by the thre;~ 
Gr0at Power~ , The People's Re)ublic ~ f China, the United State s 
and the Scviet Uni ,;n ·;f their resl;ective and c ·.::ll~ctive interes-t 
i n cal l ing a halt to the ·Jld fashi -·ned habits c.f Great PoweT 
intervention and rivalry . Surely in the rast qusrter century 
the Great Puwers have received arn1Jle evi.dE:~r:te:: r::; ,_,f ho',v e:x-:;r: .. J, :rdinaryly 
difficult it is t 1 mould S1utheast Asian CJuntries in their own 
image and likeness and, indeed h w indigestibl e even the smallest 
ScuthGast ~sian c J untries are! 
39 . In c . .:ncl usi (; n, what vle are asking f or is very siople, 
namely .'ln , ,pen guarantee by th r.:; ·rhree Gre;1t PJ wers t) r(~S~) c::ct 
the integrity and neutrality of S1utheast Asia. This guarantee 
i n its simplest f0ro need ~ nly take the f orm Jf an J r~l ~r,n , uncem en~ 
at the United Nati cns . We dJ n j t deny - indeed we are ~rep1red in 
our own interests to encuurage - the l e gitim~te interests of all 
::,;utside p:)wers in the ec.Jnumic, s ·cial and cultural fields. 
This is n ;t much t .~1 sk f ·r and we ~jr :,f o undly belie--:'c thc-t 
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rejection ~f 8Ur invitati ~ n w;uld be contr2ry to the interests 
cf all c ~ ncerned including the Great Powers themselves. 
40. The neutralisation concept h~s mqde ~r8visi 1ns f ·r 
this. We have already made a good start by the decl3rati n ~f 
the five cJuntries j f ASEAN to have SDutheast Asia rec1gnised 
and res~ected as z~ne .,f peace, freed ~o and neutrality. 
41 • Eventually it is envisaged there will be a cc nvergence 
,_i f m _v,'jments by cuuntries in the regi __ n tJwards the same direction 
and unity on purpuse - the unity of small c Juntries who are 
integrated in every sense in their ec1numic, social and political 
devel J~ment. This in the final analysis wc uld c •nstitute th~ 
backb2ne Jf a strong and united Southeast Asia wh~se potentials 
and credentials wuuld be a fact _) r t u be reck_;ned with· in w:_: rld 
affairs. 
42. The tasks which lie ahead to achieve ,ur plans 
constitutes a challenge - a challenge f.>r the countries of 
S . ..~ u the as t 1\sia - t .) ensure that we be masters ._. f .Jur cwn des tiny 
and n ut merely passive pawns in the p licies ;f the major p0wers. 
43. Equally, this challenge is n)t only for s ~ utheast 
Asia but als- una which will )T0Vide the Big Fe wer with the 
J~~crtunity c f preventing the mistakes of thepost from being 
carried into the future. 
Thank you. 
Bunn-Bad G ~des berg, 
gth December. jg71. 
